JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION OF THE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY: A STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Douglas K. Moll *
INTRODUCTION

The limited liability company (“LLC”) is a noncorporate business
structure that provides its owners, known as “members,” with several
benefits: (1) limited liability for the obligations of the venture, even if a
member participates in the control of the business; (2) pass-through income tax treatment; and (3) contractual freedom to arrange the internal
operations of the venture. Because of this favorable combination of attributes, the LLC has emerged as the preferred business structure for
many closely held businesses. 1
* Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P Professor of Law, University of Houston Law
Center.
1

As one commentator noted:
The [LLC] is now undeniably the most popular
form of new business entity in the United States. .
. . Rising from near obscurity in the 1990s, the
LLC has now taken its place as the new “king-ofthe-hill” among business entities, utterly dominating its closest rivals. As the research reported in
this article indicates, the number of new LLCs
formed in America in 2007 now outpaces the
number of new corporations formed by a margin
of nearly two to one. In several “bellwether”
states, the numbers are even more impressive. . . .
Other business forms have fared no better against
the LLC. While data for hybrid and newer business structures is more difficult to compile, the data in this Article relating to limited partnerships
(LPs) demonstrate that the LLC’s dominance of
these entities is even more staggering. For example, the number of new LLCs formed in 2007
outpaced the number of new LPs formed in that
same year by a margin of over 34 to 1.
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The LLC was the product of innovative professionals creating
solutions when the legal system failed to meet client needs. Hamilton
Brothers Oil Company had been involved in international oil and gas
exploration using foreign business organizations, primarily the Panamanian “limitada.” 2 Limitadas provided limited liability for all owners and
the ability to secure partnership classification for tax purposes. 3 Because
no similar domestic entity existed in the United States, representatives of
Hamilton Brothers suggested legislation that authorized the creation of
an unincorporated domestic entity that resembled the limitada. An initial
effort to obtain enactment in Alaska failed, but the same legislation was
enacted in Wyoming on March 4, 1977, apparently without controversy. 4
The critical question then became whether the Internal Revenue Service
would permit partnership taxation for an unincorporated entity that provided limited liability to all of its owners. A favorable ruling on the question was obtained in 1988. 5 Once the tax issue was resolved, states quickly adopted LLC statutes to take advantage of the flexibility of the new
business form. By the end of 1994, forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia had adopted an LLC statute, and by the end of 1996, all 50
states had done so. 6

Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill, 15 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN.
L. 459, 459–62 (2010).
See Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1459, 1463 (1998).
2

See id.; see also Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company:
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 922 &
n.132 (2005).
3

4

See Hamill, supra note 2, at 1464–65.

See Rev. Rul. 88–76, 1988–2 C.B. 360 (classifying LLCs as partnerships for federal
income tax purposes so long as certain criteria were met); see also Robert B. Keatinge,
New Gang in Town, BUS. L. TODAY 5, 6 (Mar./Apr. 1995) (“In Revenue Ruling 88-76,
the [IRS] . . . ruled that an LLC created according to the Wyoming act would be treated
as a partnership for tax purposes. The ruling marked a significant shift in the IRS’ policy with respect to entities in which the liability of the owners is limited to the owners’
investment.”).
5

6

See Hamill, supra note 2, at 1476–77 & n.74.
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Because of concerns that diversity in state law might create serious problems for interstate LLCs, attempts to develop prototype or uniform LLC statutes began after the LLC’s tax status was recognized. 7 The
rush by states to enact LLC legislation was underway, however, and
many states enacted an LLC statute before efforts to develop standardized statutes came to fruition. As a result, LLC statutes tend to be less
uniform than statutes governing other business forms. 8
One example of this non-uniformity involves the statutory
grounds available to members who seek judicial dissolution of an LLC.
This article catalogs each jurisdiction’s grounds and explores a few selected issues raised by the diverse approaches. Part I summarizes the
methodology used and highlights the frequency of various statutory provisions. Part II analyzes two particular provisions—dissolution if it is
not reasonably practicable to carry on the LLC’s business in conformity
with its governing documents, and dissolution as a result of oppressive
conduct by those in control. With respect to the “not reasonably practicable” language, the article argues that the impracticability of carrying on
the business in conformity with either the certificate or the operating
agreement should result in dissolution, but there is confusion over which
statutory articulation is consistent with this result. With respect to the
oppressive conduct ground, this article provides some possible explanations for why oppression-related dissolution statutes are less common in
the LLC setting than in the corporation context.
I. THE STATUTORY GROUNDS

To begin with methodology, I used Westlaw to examine the statutory grounds available to members who seek judicial dissolution of an
LLC in all fifty states plus the District of Columbia. My searches were
conducted over a one-week time period from August 7–13, 2017. I also
examined the judicial dissolution grounds in five model statutes: the 1992
See id. at 1471 (noting “the formation of a working group to draft a prototype LLC
statute” and “the solicitation of the Uniform Law Commissioners to open a study project for a Uniform LLC Act”).

7

See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996) (prefatory note) (noting
that “state limited liability company acts display a dazzling array of diversity”).
8
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Prototype LLC Act (“Prototype”), the 2011 Revised Prototype LLC Act
(“Revised Prototype”), the 1996 Uniform LLC Act (“ULLCA”), the
2006 Revised Uniform LLC Act (“RULLCA”), and the 2013 Revised
Uniform LLC Act (“RULLCA (2013)”). Thus, my total sample was fifty-six statutes—i.e., fifty states, the District of Columbia, and five model
provisions. Only judicial dissolution grounds available to members were
examined; thus, grounds available to a transferee, the state, or the LLC
itself were ignored (unless, of course, that same ground was available to a
member).
The most common judicial dissolution ground in the sample is
when the court decides that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on
the business in conformity with the LLC’s governing documents. Fiftyfour statutes include some version of this language. 9 Interestingly, this
ground is articulated in several different ways. Twenty-three of the fiftyfour statutes allow for judicial dissolution if a court decides that “[i]t is
not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities in conformity with the certificate of organization and the operating agreement.” 10 Another sixteen statutes provide for judicial dissolution if a
See infra Appendix 1, 2. Alaska and Kansas are the two statutes in the sample without
some version of this language. See id. That said, Alaska allows for judicial dissolution
when “the court determines that is impossible for the company to carry on the purposes of the company.” ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.405. That ground is similar to the “it is not
reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities and affairs” language used by
three statutes that were included in the “not reasonably practicable” count. See infra
note 13 and accompanying text. In other words, one might make a case for including
Alaska in the “not reasonably practicable” count because its statutory language is comparable. See also infra note 32 (noting that reasonable minds could disagree with some of
the categorization choices made in this article).
9

See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 489.701(1)(d)(2) (emphasis added); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB.
CO. ACT § 701(a)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis added); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language). The language of these twenty-three
statutes may differ slightly, but not in a material way.
10

The Texas statute allows for dissolution if “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on
the entity’s business in conformity with its governing documents.” TEX. BUS. ORGS.
CODE ANN. § 11.314. The statute defines “governing documents” as the certificate of
formation and “the other documents or agreements adopted by the entity under this code
to govern the formation or the internal affairs of the entity.” Id. § 1.002(36) (emphasis
added). If the LLC itself is not a signatory to the operating agreement, one might argue
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court decides that “[i]t is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the certificate of formation or the operating
agreement.” 11 An additional twelve statutes allow a court to dissolve upon a finding that “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited
liability company’s activities and affairs in conformity with the limited

that the agreement is not a “governing document” because it was not adopted by the
entity. Texas recently amended its statute, however, to provide that “[a] company
agreement is enforceable by or against the limited liability company, regardless of
whether the company has signed or otherwise expressly adopted the agreement.” Id.
§ 101.052(f). Because the LLC is bound by the operating agreement, the agreement will
presumably be considered a “governing document” under Texas law (although the fact
that the LLC did not “adopt” the agreement still leaves some room for argument). For
purposes of Appendix 2, Texas was counted as one of the twenty-three statutes with a
certificate of organization and operating agreement construction. See infra Appendix 2.
11 See, e.g., MISS. CODE § 79-29-803(1)(a) (emphasis added); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-40
(emphasis added); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the
statutory language). The language of these sixteen statutes may differ slightly, but not
in a material way.

Tennessee has two judicial dissolution statutes. Section 48-245-902 is applicable to every domestic LLC formed before January 1, 2006 that has not elected to be governed by
chapter 249 of the Tennessee Code. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-245-902, 48-2491002(c). It provides for dissolution “whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry
on the business in conformity with the articles and/or the operating agreement.” Id.
§ 48-245-902. For purposes of Appendix 2, this language was considered to be a certificate of organization or operating agreement construction. See infra Appendix 2.
Section 48-249-617 is applicable to every domestic LLC formed on or after January 1,
2006, and any domestic LLC formed before that date that has elected to be governed
by chapter 249. See id. §§ 48-249-617, 48-249-1002(a)–(b). It provides for dissolution
“whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with
the LLC documents.” Id. § 48-249-617(a). Although this language seems like a certificate of organization and operating agreement construction, the Tennessee statute defines “LLC documents” as “either, or both: (A) [a]n LLC’s articles; and (B) [i]f the LLC
has an operating agreement . . . its operating agreement.” Id. § 48-249-102(16) (emphasis added). Thus, for purposes of Appendix 2, it too was considered to be a certificate
of organization or operating agreement construction. See infra Appendix 2. Although
Tennessee could have been counted twice in my sample in light of its two existing judicial dissolution statutes, it was counted only once in Appendix 2 as one of sixteen statutes (rather than two of seventeen statutes) with a certificate of organization or operating agreement construction. See infra Appendix 2.
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liability company agreement.” 12 Three more states allow for dissolution
when a court concludes that “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on
the company’s activities and affairs.” 13 Finally, one state provides for
dissolution when a court concludes that “it is not practicable to conduct
the LLC’s business in conformance with the operating agreement and
this Chapter.” 14
The next most common judicial dissolution ground in the sample
is the presence of unlawful, illegal, or fraudulent conduct by members,
managers, or the LLC itself. Twenty-nine statutes include some version
of this language. 15 The most prevalent formulation is to provide one
ground that focuses on the company’s activities (“the conduct of all or
substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful”) 16 and another
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10A-5A-7.01(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785(A)(1); see also
infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language). The
language of these twelve statutes may differ slightly, but not in a material way.

12

The Wisconsin statute allows for dissolution when the LLC “is not acting in conformity
with an operating agreement,” and it additionally provides for dissolution when “it is
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the limited liability company.”
WIS. STAT. § 183.0902(1), (2). As a result, it is counted twice in the data—once as one
of the twelve statutes with a “not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liability
company’s activities and affairs in conformity with the limited liability company agreement” construction, and once as one of the three statutes with a “not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities and affairs” construction. See infra note 13
and accompanying text.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-267(a)(4)(B); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304C:134(I)(a); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language). The language of these three statutes may differ slightly, but not in a material way. It should be noted that the Wisconsin statute is double-counted in the data.
See supra note 12.
13

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2)(i); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data
and providing the statutory language). An astute reader may notice that the listed categories add up to fifty-five statutes (23+16+12+3+1) rather than the fifty-four number
stated in the text. See supra text accompanying note 9. The discrepancy is due to the
fact that Wisconsin is double-counted in the data. See supra note 12.
14

15

See infra Appendix 1, 2.

See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4101(a)(4)(A); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT
§ 701(a)(4)(A) (2006); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing
the statutory language).

16
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ground that focuses on the behavior of the managers or members (“the
managers . . . or those members in control of the company . . . have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent”). 17
Some statutes, however, limit the focus exclusively to the conduct of the
managers or members in control. 18
Dissolution on the grounds of oppressive conduct by managers
or members is included in twenty-four statutes in the sample. 19 Most
statutes articulate this ground by using the term “oppressive” or “unfairly
prejudicial” action by the managers or members in control of the company. 20 A very small number of statutes speak of conduct that is an
“abuse of authority,” 21 and a few refer to dissolution when necessary to
protect the “rights and interests” of the petitioning member. 22 I included
all of these variations in this category.
Ten statutes provide for judicial dissolution when the economic
purpose of the company cannot be accomplished. 23 Most statutes articulate this ground by providing that “the economic purpose of the [LLC] is

See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32.1-50(1)(e)(1); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT
§ 701(a)(5)(A) (2006); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing
the statutory language).

17

See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(4)(v) (1996); see also infra Appendix 1, 2
(summarizing the data and providing the statutory language). If the company’s activities are unlawful, those in control of the company are presumably acting in a manner
that is illegal. The absence of an independent ground that focuses on the company’s
activities, therefore, may not make much of a difference.
18

19

See infra Appendix 1, 2.

See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(4)(v) (1996); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO.
ACT § 701(a)(5)(B) (2006); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language).
20

See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17707.03(b)(5); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing
the data and providing the statutory language).
21

See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2)(ii); see also CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 17707.03(b)(2) (“rights or interests”); infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and
providing the statutory language).
22

23

See infra Appendix 1, 2.
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likely to be unreasonably frustrated.” 24 One statute provides for dissolution when a court determines “that it is impossible for the company to
carry on the purposes of the company,” 25 while another is triggered
when the “business of the limited liability company has been abandoned.” 26 I included all of these variations in this category.
Other grounds for judicial dissolution include the following: (1)
member conduct that makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the
company’s business with that member (seven statutes); 27 (2) failure to
purchase the petitioner’s distributional interest when required (five statutes); 28 (3) member or manager deadlock (five statutes); 29 (4) waste or
misapplication of assets (four statutes); 30 (5) abuse of power by the LLC

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.47(B)(1); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT
§ 801(4)(i) (1996); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the
statutory language).

24

ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.405; see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and
providing the statutory language).
25

CAL. CORP. CODE § 17707.03(b)(3); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data
and providing the statutory language).
26

See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-801(4)(B); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(4)(ii)
(1996); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory
language).
27

Upon a dissociation that does not result in dissolution, ULLCA § 701(a) requires the
company to purchase the distributional interest of the dissociated member. Failure to
effectuate the purchase can result in dissolution. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT
§ 801(4)(iv) (1996). This dissolution ground is also present in the statutes that follow
ULLCA. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 31B-8-801(b)(5)(iv); see also infra Appendix 1, 2
(summarizing the data and providing the statutory language).
28

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785(A)(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,117(b); see
also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language).

29

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 605.0702(1)(b)(4); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-803(1)(b); see also
infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language).

30
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contrary to the public policy of the state (one statute); 31 and (6) “other
circumstances [that] render dissolution equitable” (one statute). 32
II. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED GROUNDS

A. In Conformity With . . . ?
As mentioned, the most common judicial dissolution ground is
when a court decides that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in conformity with the LLC’s governing documents. 33 In pracSee N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:134(III)(d); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language).

31

See WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.274(2); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the
data and providing the statutory language). This broad “circumstances [that] render
dissolution equitable” ground is unique to Washington. The 1914 Uniform Partnership
Act included the same ground in its judicial dissolution section, see UNIF. P’SHIP ACT
§ 32(1)(f) (1914), which may be the origin of the Washington provision. In fact, the
ground was formerly a part of the Washington general partnership statute. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 25.04.320(1)(f) (1998).
32

Reasonable minds could disagree with some of the categorization choices made in this
article. For example, a statute providing for dissolution when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the governing documents is similar
to a statute allowing for dissolution when the economic purpose of the company cannot be accomplished. See supra notes 9–14, 23–26 and accompanying text. Indeed,
judicial decisions grappling with the “not reasonably practicable” language have granted
dissolution when the purpose of the company has been frustrated. See infra note 37 and
accompanying text. Thus, perhaps these two categories should be combined. As another example, a statute providing for dissolution when member conduct makes it not
reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s business with that member, or a statute authorizing dissolution under equitable circumstances, may very well cover the same
ground as a statute allowing for dissolution when a member in control has acted oppressively. See supra notes 19–22, 27, 32 and accompanying text; infra notes 89–91 and
accompanying text. Perhaps they too should not be thought of as separate categories.
See supra text accompanying note 9. From a Uniform Act standpoint, this language
appears to have originated in the 1976 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, as
§ 802 of that act allowed for judicial dissolution “whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership agreement.” (Notice
that the certificate of limited partnership is not mentioned.) The first time that two
documents were mentioned—the public filing and the private agreement of the owners—appears to have been in the 1996 ULLCA (§ 801(4)(iii)). That two-document
structure was then followed by the 2006 RULLCA (§ 701(a)(4)(B)) and the 2013
33
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tice, what circumstances might trigger this ground? In Fisk Ventures,
LLC v. Segal, 34 the Delaware Court of Chancery provided the following
guidance:
Section 18-802 has the “obvious purpose of
providing an avenue of relief when an LLC
cannot continue to function in accordance
with its chartering agreement.”
In interpreting § 18-802, this Court has by
analogy often looked to the dissolution statute for limited partnerships, 6 Del. C. § 17802. In so doing, the Court has found that
“the test of § 17-802 is whether it is ‘reasonably practicable’ to carry on the business of a
limited partnership, and not whether it is impossible.” To decide whether to dissolve a
partnership pursuant to § 17-802, the courts
have historically looked to the “business of
the partnership and the general partner’s ability to achieve that purpose in conformity with
the partnership agreement.” …
The text of § 18-802 does not specify what a
court must consider in evaluating the “reasonably practicable” standard, but several
convincing factual circumstances have pervaded the case law: (1) the members’ vote is
deadlocked at the Board level; (2) the operating agreement gives no means of navigating
around the deadlock; and (3) due to the fi-

RULLCA (§ 701(a)(4)(B)). Interestingly, although the 2001 Uniform Limited Partnership Act followed prior uniform limited partnership acts by only mentioning conformity with the partnership agreement (§ 802), the 2013 Uniform Limited Partnership Act
adopted a two-document structure by requiring conformity “with the certificate of limited partnership and partnership agreement” (§ 801(a)(6)(B)).
34

Civ. A. No. 3017-CC, 2009 WL 73957 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2009).
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nancial condition of the company, there is effectively no business to operate.
These factual circumstances are not individually dispositive; nor must they all exist for a
court to find it no longer reasonably practicable for a business to continue operating. In
fact, the Court in Haley v. Talcott found that
although the limited liability company was
“technically functioning” and “financially stable,” meaning that it received rent checks and
paid a mortgage, it should be dissolved because the company’s activity was “purely a residual, inertial status quo that just happens to
exclusively benefit one of the 50% members.” If a board deadlock prevents the limited liability company from operating or from
furthering its stated business purpose, it is
not reasonably practicable for the company
to carry on its business. 35
On the facts before it, the Fisk Ventures court concluded that
“[w]hen … a company has no office, no employees, no operating revenue, no prospects of equity or debt infusion, and when the company’s
Board has a long history of deadlock as a result of its governance structure, more than ample reason and sufficient evidence exists to order dissolution.” 36 Other decisions grappling with the “not reasonably practicable” language have granted dissolution when the purpose of the company has been frustrated. 37
35

Id. at *3–4 (internal citations omitted).

36

Id. at *1.

See, e.g., In re Silver Leaf, L.L.C., No. Civ. A. 20611, 2005 WL 2045641, at *10–11
(Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2005) (granting dissolution under DLLCA § 18–802: “Silver Leaf
was formed for the specific purpose of marketing the vending machines of Tasty Fries .
. . . Thus, at the time the dispute between the parties began, the only asset of Silver Leaf
was the SMA [a sales and marketing agreement giving Silver Leaf the right to market
the vending machines] . . . . Now, the SMA is no longer an asset of Silver Leaf because

37
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Tasty Fries terminated that contract . . . . Clearly, the business of marketing Tasty
Fries’s machines no longer exists for Silver Leaf . . . . The vote of the members is deadlocked and the Operating Agreement provides no means around the deadlock. Moreover, Silver Leaf has no business to operate. Therefore, upon application of a member . .
. the court dissolves Silver Leaf.”); In re Arrow Inv. Advisors, LLC, C.A. No. 4091-VCS,
2009 WL 1101682, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2009) (“[D]issolution is reserved for situations in which the LLC’s management has become so dysfunctional or its business purpose so thwarted that it is no longer practicable to operate the business, such as in the
case of a voting deadlock or where the defined purpose of the entity has become impossible to fulfill.”); id. at *3 (“Dissolution of an entity chartered for a broad business
purpose remains possible upon a strong showing that a confluence of situationally specific adverse financial, market, product, managerial, or corporate governance circumstances make it nihilistic for the entity to continue. In other words, a petitioner might
obtain dissolution by making a convincing showing that the perpetuation of the entity,
irrespective of its managers’ intentions to pursue a business line allowed by its governing instrument, was obviously futile and would not result in business success.”); id.
(“One need not speculate on exactly what circumstances of that type might suffice to
make that showing in order to confidently conclude that Hamman cannot state a claim
for dissolution by simply alleging that a two-year-old LLC with a broad purpose clause
has experienced some adversity and therefore ought to be dissolved. By that standard,
investors could state a claim for dissolution against virtually all entities on a regular basis, especially in years of economic turbulence like this one.”); In re 1545 Ocean Ave.,
LLC, 893 N.Y.S.2d 590, 597–98 (App. Div. 2010) (“After careful examination of the
various factors considered in applying the ‘not reasonably practicable’ standard, we hold
that for dissolution of a limited liability company . . . the petitioning member must establish, in the context of the terms of the operating agreement or articles of incorporation, that (1) the management of the entity is unable or unwilling to reasonably permit
or promote the stated purpose of the entity to be realized or achieved, or (2) continuing
the entity is financially unfeasible.”); McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d
1193, 1220, 1222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he evidence does support the trial court’s
conclusion that it was no longer practicable to carry on the business of CHL [an LLC
formed for the purpose of obtaining a National Hockey League franchise in Columbus,
Ohio] . . . . The above evidence shows that the cause of it being no longer practicable
to carry on the business of CHL was the fact that CHL was not the ownership group
awarded the NHL franchise . . . . June 9, 1997 was the deadline for the ownership
group to be identified. This ownership group was not CHL. Hence, as of June 9, 1997,
the reason for CHL’s existence was gone.”); cf. Dunbar Group, LLC v. Tignor, 593
S.E.2d 216, 219 (Va. 2004) (concluding that serious disagreement between the members
does not necessarily meet the dissolution standard, as even with discord, it may still be
reasonably practicable to carry on the business: “Although Tignor’s actions [as a member and manager of Xpert, the LLC] had created numerous problems in the operation
of Xpert, his expulsion as a member changed his role from one of an active participant
in the management of Xpert to the more passive role of an investor in the company.
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While case law has provided some guidance on the circumstances
that might lead to dissolution under this ground, the differences in the
statutory articulations are puzzling. Why, for example, do twenty-three
statutes allow for dissolution if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on
the business in conformity with the certificate and the operating agreement, while another sixteen statutes provide for dissolution only if it is
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with
the certificate or the operating agreement? Is this a meaningful distinction? Given that the members, the managers, and the LLC itself are
constrained by provisions in both the certificate and the operating
agreement, 38 one would think that the impracticability of carrying on the
business in conformity with either one of those governing documents
should be enough for dissolution.
For example, assume that the certificate of an LLC contains a
broad purpose clause allowing the LLC to engage in any lawful business.
The operating agreement, however, states the purpose of the venture in
much narrower terms—to operate a particular fast-food franchise. After
years of mismanagement, the franchisor revokes the franchise. This
seems like a good case for dissolution, as the purpose of the company
The record fails to show that after this change in the daily management of Xpert, it
would not be reasonably practicable for Xpert to carry on its business pursuant to its
operating authority.”).
If the LLC itself is not a signatory to the operating agreement, one might argue that
the LLC is not constrained by the provisions of the agreement. Compare Bubbles &
Bleach, LLC v. Becker, No. 97 C 1320, 1997 WL 285938, at *4–6 (N.D. Ill. May 23,
1997) (holding that an arbitration clause in an LLC operating agreement was not binding on the LLC because it was not a party to the agreement), with Elf Atochem N. Am.,
Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 293 (Del. 1999) (rejecting the argument that an arbitration
provision in an LLC agreement was inapplicable to the LLC because it failed to sign the
agreement). In some jurisdictions, this issue is now handled by statute. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (“A limited liability company is bound by its limited liability company agreement whether or not the limited liability company executes the
limited liability company agreement.”); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.052(f) (“A
company agreement is enforceable by or against the limited liability company, regardless
of whether the company has signed or otherwise expressly adopted the agreement.”);
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 106(a) (2006) (amended 2013) (“A limited liability
company is bound by and may enforce the operating agreement, whether or not the
company has itself manifested assent to the operating agreement.”).
38
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has been frustrated (i.e., the LLC can no longer operate a franchise of
this particular restaurant). An “or” statute may very well reach this dissolution result, as it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business
in conformity with the operating agreement (and its more narrow purpose). 39 That said, it is still possible to operate the business in conformity with the certificate, as any other lawful business may be pursued. Under an “and” statute, therefore, dissolution may be unavailable, as it is
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the
certificate. 40
Of course, this argument assumes that an “and” statute would be
interpreted to result in dissolution only (A) if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the certificate, and (B) if
it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity
with the operating agreement. Under this “double-condition” construction, both (A) and (B) have to be met to result in dissolution. Conversely, the practicability of carrying on the business in conformity with either
the certificate or the operating agreement will prevent dissolution from
occurring. There is, however, another reasonable construction. Perhaps
an “and” statute should be interpreted to mean that dissolution results
only if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the certificate and the operating agreement as a set. Under
this “single-condition” construction, the sole condition for dissolution is
if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity
with both of the governing documents. Conversely, if it is reasonably
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with both of the governing documents, then dissolution is denied. Under this interpretation,
our example above would result in dissolution because it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with both of the
governing documents; instead, it is reasonably practicable to carry on the
business with only one of the governing documents (the certificate). 41
This assumes a double-condition construction of an “or” statute. See infra text accompanying note 42.
39

This assumes a double-condition construction of an “and” statute. See infra text accompanying note 41.
40

41

See supra text accompanying notes 39–40.
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This interpretive issue is present with “or” statutes as well.
Should the statute receive a double-condition construction—i.e., dissolution occurs only (A) if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in conformity with the certificate, or (B) if it is not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the operating
agreement? Under such a construction, either (A) or (B) has to be met
to result in dissolution. Conversely, the practicability of carrying on the
business in conformity with both the certificate and the operating
agreement will prevent dissolution from occurring. Alternatively, perhaps the statute should receive a single-condition construction where
dissolution results only if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in conformity with the certificate or the operating agreement as
a set. The sole condition for dissolution, in other words, is if it is not
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the
certificate or the operating agreement. Conversely, if it is reasonably
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the certificate or
the operating agreement, then dissolution is denied. Using our example
in the text (it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in
conformity with the operating agreement, but it is reasonably practicable
to carry on the business in conformity with the certificate), notice that
the double-condition construction would result in dissolution, while the
single-condition construction would not. 42
The key point from this discussion is that the impracticability of
carrying on the business in conformity with either the certificate or the
operating agreement should result in dissolution, as the members, the
managers, and the LLC itself are constrained by provisions in both documents. 43 Nevertheless, there is some confusion over which statutory
articulation is consistent with this result. Depending on how courts construe the statutes, it may be that both “and” and “or” statutory articulations will reach this preferred outcome. An “and” statute with a singlecondition construction does, as does an “or” statute with a double42

See supra text accompanying notes 39–40.

But see supra note 38 (stating that if the LLC itself is not a signatory to the operating
agreement, one might argue that the LLC is not constrained by the provisions of the
agreement).
43
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condition construction. Indeed, it may very well be that drafters of both
“and” and “or” statutes (whether legislatures or uniform organizations)
were all trying to reach this result, but the “and” drafters were thinking
of a single-condition construction, while the “or” drafters were thinking
of a double-condition construction. Of course, depending on what
courts do, it is possible that neither statutory articulation will reach the
preferred outcome (e.g., an “and” statute with a double-condition construction, and an “or” statute with a single-condition construction).
An additional twelve statutes allow a court to dissolve upon a
finding that “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liability company’s activities and affairs in conformity with the limited liability
company agreement.” 44 Under this formulation, the operating agreement
is the only document that matters. This also seems problematic given
that the business of the LLC has to be conducted in conformity with the
provisions of the certificate. 45 While it is true that most LLC certificates
will not include any provisions beyond the minimum statutory requirements, there is nothing preventing an LLC from including numerous
substantive provisions in its certificate, including provisions that would
typically be found in an operating agreement. 46 For example, modifying
our earlier hypothetical slightly, suppose an LLC’s certificate stated a narrow purpose for the business—i.e., to operate a particular fast-food franchise—and suppose further that the franchisor revokes the franchise.
Once again, this seems like a good case for dissolution, as the purpose of
the company has been frustrated (i.e., the LLC can no longer operate a
franchise of this particular restaurant). Indeed, given that the narrow
44

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

45 Cf. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a) (“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the
members of a limited liability company shall adopt a written operating agreement that
contains any provisions not inconsistent with law or its articles of organization . . . .” (emphasis added)).

See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201(c) (2006) (amended 2013) (noting
that “[a] certificate of organization may contain statements as to matters other than
those required”); see also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 203(b) (1996) (stating that
“[a]rticles of organization of a limited liability company may set forth . . . provisions
permitted to be set forth in an operating agreement . . . or . . . other matters not inconsistent with law”).
46
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purpose clause was in the certificate, any post-revocation activities of the
LLC are arguably ultra vires. 47 Nevertheless, under a statutory formulation that looks only at a lack of conformity with the provisions of the
operating agreement, dissolution may be unavailable.
Of course, a court might find an implied provision in the operating agreement that the business must be conducted in accordance with
the certificate. The inability to operate the franchise, therefore, would
make it not reasonably practicable to carry on the LLC’s business in conformity with the operating agreement (i.e., the operating agreement requires conformity with the certificate, and the narrow purpose provision
in the certificate cannot be complied with). Alternatively, given that
“operating agreement” is usually defined broadly to encompass any
agreement of the members regarding the LLC, 48 perhaps a court would
characterize the certificate as a form of operating agreement. 49 After all,
to the extent that the members are bound by the provisions of the certif47 An act outside the scope of an organization’s stated purpose is “ultra vires.” The
doctrine is typically associated with corporation law, but it would presumably apply to
an LLC as well. See generally DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATIONS § 2.08 (LexisNexis 2016) (discussing the ultra vires doctrine).

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (defining “limited liability company
agreement” as “any agreement (whether referred to as a limited liability company
agreement, operating agreement or otherwise), written, oral or implied, of the member
or members as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business”).

48

Cf. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 107 cmt. (2006) (amended 2013) (stating
that “language in an LLC’s certificate of organization . . . might be evidence of the
members’ agreement and might thereby constitute or at least imply a term of the operating agreement”).
49

The Delaware statute provides for dissolution when “it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business in conformity with a limited liability company agreement.” DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802. In In re Seneca Investments LLC, 970 A.2d 259 (Del. Ch.
2008), the court stated that “[i]n determining whether it is reasonably practicable to
carry on the business of the LLC, the Court must look to the purpose clause set forth
in the governing agreements, in this case, the charter.” Id. at 263 (emphasis added). The
court denied dissolution, at least in part because the LLC’s charter had a broad “any
lawful act” purpose clause. See id. No mention was made of the fact that the Delaware
statute, on its face, is limited to a consideration of the limited liability company agreement. See id.
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icate, we might characterize the certificate as a “deemed agreement” of
the members. By doing so, the revocation of the franchise would result
in the inability to carry on the LLC’s business in conformity with an operating agreement. The need to stretch to make these arguments, however, demonstrates that a statutory formulation considering only the operating agreement is misguided. Once again, statutes allowing for dissolution when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in
conformity with either the certificate or the operating agreement seem
more sensible. 50
B. Whither Oppression
In general, the oppression doctrine protects minority owners
from the abusive exercise of majority control. 51 Common examples of
oppressive conduct include the termination of a minority owner’s employment, the removal of a minority owner from a management position,
the refusal to make distributions, and the denial of access to company
information. 52 The oppression problem originated in the closely held
corporation setting as a result of four factors that are present in that conThe North Carolina statute allows for judicial dissolution when “it is not practicable
to conduct the LLC’s business in conformance with the operating agreement and this
Chapter.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2)(i); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
The “Chapter” (the North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act) requires articles of
organization to be filed, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-2-21, and the provisions of the
articles are presumably binding on the managers, members, and the LLC itself. Thus, it
would seem that the North Carolina statute can be analogized to statutes allowing for
dissolution when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the LLC’s business in conformity with the certificate and the operating agreement. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
50

Three statutes allow for judicial dissolution when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities and affairs. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
These statutes have no limiting “in conformity with” language. This approach seems to
give flexibility to courts to dissolve in any situation involving frustration of the purpose
of the business.
See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and the New Louisiana Business Corporation Act, 60 LOY. L. REV. 461, 462 (2014); see generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47,
ch. 7 (providing an in-depth discussion of the oppression doctrine); id. ch. 8 (providing
an in-depth discussion of remedies for oppression).
51

52

See, e.g., MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, § 7.01[A], at 7-5.
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text—the lack of exit rights, the norm of majority rule, the deference of
the business judgment rule, and the absence of advance planning. 53
Those same factors are present in the LLC setting as well:
Although generalizations are dangerous due
to the wide variety of LLC statutes, the
“seeds” of oppression are, in many jurisdictions, present in the LLC setting. The same
combination of “no exit” and majority
rule—a combination that has left minority
shareholders vulnerable in the close corporation for decades—exists in the LLC. Further, the deference of the business judgment
rule and the likely absence of contractual
safeguards will stymie most minority efforts
to obtain relief. Given this setting, and
based on the close corporation experience, it
is inevitable that some majority owners will
abuse their control at the expense of minority investors. Just as in the close corporation,
53

As I have written elsewhere:
In the close corporation setting, four primary factors form the “seeds” of the oppression problem—the lack of exit rights, the norm of majority
rule, the deference of the business judgment rule,
and the absence of advance planning. Standing
alone, the existence of any one of these factors in
a particular business setting might be insufficient
to warrant a special remedial doctrine. In combination, however, the existence of all of these factors in the same business context creates a great
potential for abuse of minority investors. Undoubtedly, the presence of these factors in the
close corporation environment spurred the need
for judicial oversight and prompted the development of the modern-day shareholder oppression
doctrine.

Moll, supra note 3, at 916–17.
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legitimate judicial scrutiny of majority conduct is needed. The oppression doctrine, in
other words, has a place in the LLC structure as well. 54
Despite these similarities, judicial dissolution statutes in the corporation setting are far more likely to include oppression-related protection than similar statutes in the LLC context. Corporation statutes in
forty states provide for dissolution or other relief on the grounds of
“oppressive actions” (or similar term) by “directors or those in control.” 55 In contrast, LLC statutes in only twenty-one states provide similar oppression-related protection. 56 Given that the oppression problem
can arise in both forms of business organization, what might explain this
difference? Some thoughts are presented below.
1. Exit Rights 57
Exit rights for the owners of any business organization are useful
in two major respects. First, an exit allows an owner to liquidate his investment and to recover the value of his invested capital. 58 Second, the
threat of exit in large numbers tends to restrain managers from taking action that harms the interests of owners. 59 Significantly, without exit
54

Id. at 956–57.

55

See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, § 7.01[D][1][b][i], at 7-72 n.192.

Along with the twenty-one states, three uniform acts (ULLCA, RULLCA, and
RULLCA (2013)) provide oppression-related protection in the LLC setting. See supra
notes 19–22 and accompanying text (noting that twenty-four statutes in the sample
provide for dissolution on the grounds of oppressive conduct by managers or members).
56

57

Portions of this sub-section are taken from Moll, supra note 3, at 896–97.

See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975) (observing that a market exit allows a shareholder to “sell his stock in order to extricate
some of his invested capital”).

58

Many commentators have argued that the existence of a market helps to combat the
abusive exercise of control. Professors Hetherington & Dooley, for example, state the
following:
59

Market restraints are most visible and workable in
the case of publicly held corporations. If manage-

2017]

JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION OF LLCS

101

rights, an owner’s invested capital is indefinitely “locked-into” the entity
ment is inefficient, indulges its own preferences,
or otherwise acts contrary to shareholder interests,
dissatisfied shareholders will sell their shares and
move to more attractive investment opportunities.
As more shareholders express their dissatisfaction
by selling, the market price of the company’s
shares will decline to the point where existing
management is exposed to the risk of being displaced through a corporate takeover . . . . The
mere threat of displacement, whether or not realized, is a powerful incentive for managers of publicly held corporations to promote their shareholders’ interests so as to keep the price of the
company’s shares as high and their own positions
as secure as possible.
J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1977) (footnote omitted). Similarly, as Professor Bahls observes:
A public market creates significant and powerful
incentives for managers to manage corporations in
a way that maximizes profits and owners’ returns.
A public market for stock allows dissatisfied
shareholders to sell their shares. Sales of a significant number of shares depress stock prices, making way for new owners (sometimes corporate
raiders) to buy stock and oust incompetent incumbent management. Similarly, the management
of publicly held corporations is more carefully
monitored by persons outside the corporation, including independent directors, accountants, and
investment bankers. As a result, the market creates
incentives for managers to align their interests
with the interests of shareholders.
Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited Liability Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 76–77 (1994) (footnote omitted); see also Rosenfield v. Metals
Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 n.18 (Conn. 1994) (“The market for corporate control serves to constrain managers’ conduct that does not maximize shareholder wealth.
It therefore serves to align the interests of managers more closely with the interests of
shareholders in publicly traded corporations. The market for corporate control does not
affect, however, the incentives of managers of closely held corporations.”).
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and, in general, the capital can be used as the controlling owner sees fit. 60
When exit rights are absent, therefore, oppressive conduct can result in
the “effective confiscation” of the minority’s investment. 61 Not surprisingly, a number of commentators have asserted that the lack of exit rights
is the primary cause of the oppression problem and is the factor driving
the need for judicial oversight. 62
In the closely held corporation, the lack of exit rights is a reality.
For all practical purposes, minority shareholders in closely held corporations are unable to sell, unable to demand a buyout, and unable to cause a
See, e.g., Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders
and its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 447 (1990)
(“[T]he primary vulnerability of a minority shareholder is the spectre of being ‘lockedin,’ that is, having a perpetual investment in an entity without any expectation of ever
receiving a return on that investment.”); infra note 61 (observing that oppressive conduct allows the majority to use the minority’s investment for the majority’s own purposes).
60

61 Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation Act and a Proposed Legislative
Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817, 840 (1985) (“Never should the minority participant [in an
oppression context] be understood as assenting to the effective confiscation of his or
her investment. . . .”); see, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations:
The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 817 n.267 (2000) (“In this
[oppression] context, the majority shareholder should be viewed as simply appropriating a portion of the minority’s investment to further the majority’s own interests.”); F.
Hodge O’Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS.
LAW. 873, 887 (1978) (“Not to provide a remedy in [oppressive] circumstances of this
kind is to permit the majority shareholders to exploit the minority shareholder’s investment solely for their own benefit.”).

See, e.g., Laurel Wheeling Farrar & Susan Pace Hamill, Dissociation from Alabama Limited
Liability Companies in the Post Check-the-Box Era, 49 ALA. L. REV. 909, 924 n.64 (1998)
(noting that “the most significant problem faced by the shareholders [of a close corporation]” is “that of no liquidity of shares”); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith?
The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143,
1149 (1990) (“More than any other characteristic, this ‘no exit’ phenomenon has
pushed the law into developing special rules for shareholders in close corporations.”);
Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations, 66
WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 225 (1988) (“Once a corporation’s shares are publicly traded, minority shareholders, even if they are also employees, are not subjected to the risks that
are common to the close corporation and which inspired the modern legislative and
judicial remedies.”).
62
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dissolution of the company. 63 In the LLC, however, some statutes still
provide members with the right to exit the venture and to “cash out” of
the company. These statutes are modeled after ULLCA and generally
provide for a fair value buyout upon a member’s dissociation that does
not result in dissolution of the company. 64 Member dissociation, in other
words, will provide liquidity either through a buyout or dissolution.
When exit rights are present, there is little need for explicit oppressionrelated protection, as minority owners can protect themselves from abusive majority conduct by simply dissociating and cashing out. 65 Thus, jurisdictions providing such exit rights may simply have believed that oppression-related dissolution provisions were unnecessary.
Unfortunately, this explanation has a critical weakness—it simply
does not fit the data. Only four state statutes provide exit rights, 66 and all
four additionally provide an oppression-related dissolution ground. 67 Put
differently, not a single jurisdiction stands for the proposition that state
statutes offer exit rights in lieu of oppression provisions. As a result, an
argument that exit rights explain the smaller number of LLC statutes with
63

See Moll, supra note 3, at 897–905.

See HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-701(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-808(1); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-44-701; W. VA. CODE § 31B-8-701(a); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)
(1996).
64

In an at-will LLC, the buyout is at fair value determined as of the date of dissociation.
See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)(1) (1996). In a term LLC, the buyout is at
fair value determined as of the date of the expiration of the specified term. See id.
§ 701(a)(2). A buyout in a term LLC, therefore, may take substantially longer to complete. If the LLC fails to make the required purchase of the membership interest, a court
can judicially dissolve the company. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that a number of commentators have
asserted that the lack of exit rights is the primary cause of the oppression problem and is
the factor driving the need for judicial oversight).
65

66

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

See HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-801(4)(E); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-902(1)(e); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-44-801(4)(e); W. VA. CODE § 31B-8-801(b)(5)(v); see also UNIF. LTD.
LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a) (1996) (providing for dissolution on oppression-related
grounds); infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language).
67
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oppression-related dissolution provisions seems more theoretical than
real.
Perhaps the argument can be resuscitated, at least in part, with a
historical view of exit rights in the LLC. Consider the following observations:
When the first LLC statutes were passed,
most included provisions that provided liquidity to members if they chose to exit the
business. These provisions took two forms.
First, the majority of LLC statutes provided
that members had the power to withdraw
from the business in the absence of a contrary provision in the operating agreement.
Upon withdrawal, the member was entitled
to be paid the fair value of its ownership interest less any damages caused by a wrongful
withdrawal. Second, most of the LLC statutes provided for dissolution of the LLC
upon the member’s withdrawal or other dissociation from the venture (e.g., dissociation
due to a member’s death, bankruptcy, or incompetency). An actual liquidation of the
business could be avoided, however, if all
(or a majority under some statutes) of the
remaining members elected to continue the
venture. Even if liquidation were averted,
the withdrawing member was still entitled to
a buyout of its ownership interest.
The inclusion of these provisions in the
statutory scheme of the LLC was no accident. Before 1997, the IRS applied the
“corporate resemblance” test to determine
whether an LLC would be classified as a
partnership or a corporation for tax purposes. Under that test, an LLC was “taxed like
a partnership unless it possesse[d] three or
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more of the four corporate characteristics,
including continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free transferability of interests.” Because LLCs possess
limited liability, a state’s statutory scheme
needed to deny two of the remaining corporate characteristics to insure partnership tax
status. Many statutes provided for managermanaged LLCs if the members desired, raising at least the possibility that centralized
management would be found. Thus, the
LLC statutes needed to deny the free transferability of interests and continuity of life
characteristics possessed by the traditional
corporation.
. . . . [T]he provisions calling for the LLC’s
dissolution upon the member’s withdrawal
or other dissociation from the business were
designed to resist a continuity of life finding.
Treasury Regulations at the time provided
that “[i]f the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any
member will cause a dissolution of the organization, continuity of life does not exist.”
As a result, most LLC statutory schemes included a dissolution provision with triggers
that closely tracked the language of the
Treasury Regulations.
In the first wave of LLC statutes, therefore,
the inclusion of withdrawal and dissolution
provisions provided exit rights and accompanying liquidity to LLC investors. The
withdrawal provisions obviously provided
liquidity by typically stating that a member
would receive the fair value of its ownership
interest upon withdrawal. The dissolution
provisions provided liquidity by requiring
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the company to be sold (in the event of liquidation) and by allocating to each member
its proportionate share of the company’s sale
value. If liquidation were avoided, the minority member was still entitled to its buyout
upon withdrawal. 68
As this passage reveals, exit rights were prevalent when the first
wave of LLC statutes were passed, and little attention may have been
paid to explicit oppression-related dissolution provisions as a result. As
mentioned, when exit rights are present, minority owners can protect
themselves from oppressive majority conduct; there is little need for a
judicial remedy. 69 In late 1996, however, the IRS scrapped the corporate
resemblance test in favor of the more easily administered “check the
box” regulations. Under the new regulations, an LLC automatically receives pass-through partnership income tax treatment unless it affirmatively elects otherwise. 70 Following the passage of the regulations, there
was no longer a tax-driven need to deny certain “corporate” characteristics to LLCs. In response, and spurred further by estate and gift tax concerns, many states restricted or eliminated the exit rights that had served
to combat a continuity of life finding. 71
Given this historical background, one might argue that legislatures, preoccupied with federal income tax changes affecting the LLC
and related estate and gift tax concerns, simply overlooked the connection between exit rights and protection from oppressive conduct. After
all, the statutory presence of exit rights largely eliminated any prior legislative need to focus on the oppression problem. Under this thinking,
attention to the issue might be all that is needed to prompt states to add
oppression-related dissolution provisions. That attention might come in
68

Moll, supra note 3, at 926–31 (footnotes omitted).

See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that a number of commentators have
asserted that the lack of exit rights is the primary cause of the oppression problem and is
the factor driving the need for judicial oversight).
69

70

See Moll, supra note 3, at 931–32 & n.167.

71

See id. at 932–40.
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the form of RULLCA and RULLCA (2013), which both include such
protection. 72 As states continue to reconsider their LLC statutes in light
of these modern uniform acts, the need for an oppression provision to
offset the absence of exit rights may become apparent. Some support
for this argument can be drawn from the fact that the number of states
with oppression-related dissolution provisions appears to have increased
from eight to twenty-one over the past sixteen years. 73
In short, the initial prevalence of exit rights in the LLC setting
may explain why legislatures were not focused on the oppression issue
when LLC statutes were first enacted. Now that exit rights have largely
been eliminated, it may simply be a matter of time before states realize
that their past elimination of exit rights contributes to the present vulnerability of minority members. Under this thinking, one would expect
that the number of oppression-related judicial dissolution provisions will
continue to increase with the passage of time.

See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)(5)(B) (2006); REVISED UNIF. LTD.
LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)(4)(C)(ii) (2006) (amended 2013). Interestingly, neither the 1992
Prototype LLC Act nor the 2011 Revised Prototype LLC Act includes an oppressionrelated judicial dissolution provision. Both acts were drafted by a committee of the
American Bar Association, and both provide only one judicial dissolution ground—
when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the LLC in conformity
with the operating agreement. See infra Appendix 1 (providing the statutory language).
72

Compare Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution Remedies
Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?, 38 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 413, 460–61 & n.245–46 (2001) (stating that “a growing number of states
provide the remedy of a judicial dissolution upon a showing of certain majority misconduct,” and citing the LLC statutes of Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas,
Maine, Minnesota, and Ohio), with supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that
LLC statutes in twenty-one states provide oppression-related protection).
73

On the other hand, some states adopting RULLCA or RULLCA (2013) have explicitly
removed the oppression-related dissolution ground that is present in the Uniform Acts.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 605.0702; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-801 (stating nevertheless, in the “historical and statutory notes,” that “[t]his section is similar to § 801 of the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996) and § 701 of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2006)”). South Dakota does have an oppression-related
dissolution provision in its corporation statute. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A1430(2)(b). Florida does not. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1430.
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2. Fiduciary Duty
In the closely held corporation setting, traditional principles of
fiduciary duty may not protect minority owners from oppressive majority
conduct. At least part of the reason for this lack of protection is due to
the conventional notion that fiduciary duties run to the corporation (or
to the shareholders collectively), but do not run to individual shareholders. 74 Consequently, a minority shareholder can have difficulty challenging, for example, a termination of employment or a removal from management on traditional fiduciary duty grounds, as a court usually requires
that harm to the corporation—rather than harm merely to the minority
shareholder—be shown. 75 Dissolution for oppression statutes are needed in the closely held corporation setting, therefore, because they focus

See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984)
(observing that “directors’ duties of loyalty and care run to the corporation, not to individual shareholders or even to a majority of the shareholders”); Ritchie v. Rupe, 443
S.W.3d 856, 885 n.53 (Tex. 2014) (“But a corporate officer or director’s duty is to the
corporation and its shareholders collectively, not any individual shareholder or subgroup of shareholders, even if that subgroup represents a majority of the ownership.”);
Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 488 n.13 (Tex. App. 1997) (stating that “a majority
shareholder’s fiduciary duty ordinarily runs to the corporation”); McLaughlin v.
Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 153 (Utah 2009) (“These corporate duties have been interpreted
to coincide with the common law understanding that officers and directors owe these
duties to the corporation and shareholders collectively, not individually.” (citation omitted)); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1136 (Wyo. 1985) (“The duty of the directors .
. . is a duty to the corporation and not a duty to the stockholder instituting the action.”);
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 59, at 12 & n.30 (mentioning the traditional view
that duties run “solely between the majority and the corporation,” and observing that
the “notion that the fiduciary obligations of management run only to the corporation
provides the minority in close corporations virtually no protection against oppression
and exploitation by the control group”).
74

75 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 59, at 12 (“[C]ourts undoubtedly . . . have
been influenced by traditional common law attitudes emphasizing . . . proof of harm to
the corporation as distinguished from the interests of individual shareholders.”); cf. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 & n.14 (Mass. 1975) (noting,
while discussing traditional fiduciary duty principles, that “in practice, the plaintiff will
find difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies,” and observing that it
“would be difficult for the plaintiff in the instant case to establish breach of a fiduciary
duty owed to the corporation, as indicated by the finding of the trial judge”).
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on harm to an individual minority owner in a way that traditional fiduciary duty principles do not. 76
In the LLC setting, many statutes explicitly impose a fiduciary
duty on managers (in manager-managed LLCs) and members (in member-managed LLCs) that is owed to an individual minority member. 77
That duty allows a minority member to bring a breach of fiduciary duty
action in response to managerial conduct that is harmful to the member
(rather than to the company). 78 Perhaps legislatures believed that a judicial dissolution provision was less necessary in the LLC context because
oppressive conduct could instead be remedied through an individual
breach of fiduciary duty action. 79
Although this argument seems plausible, it should be noted that
under some statutory articulations, the fiduciary duty language may be
less useful for combatting oppression. Even though the statute explicitly
provides that a fiduciary duty is owed to a member, the scope of the duty
may be limited to company-related harms. 80 In addition, with oppres-

See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30 cmt. 2 (noting that “‘oppressive’ behavior in
[the judicial dissolution statute] generally describes action directed against a particular
shareholder”).
76

See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/15-3; FLA. STAT. § 605.04091; UNIF. LTD. LIAB.
CO. ACT § 409 (1996); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006); REVISED
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006) (amended 2013).
77

But see infra note 80 and accompanying text (noting that under some statutory articulations, the scope of the fiduciary duty may be limited to company-related harms).
78

That said, both RULLCA and RULLCA (2013) (and the states that follow them) impose a fiduciary duty owed to a member that is not limited to company-related harms,
and they additionally provide an oppression-related dissolution provision. See, e.g.,
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 409 & cmt., 701(a)(5)(B) (2006); REVISED UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 409 & cmt., 701(a)(4)(C)(ii) (2006) (amended 2013); see also infra
note 80 and accompanying text (noting that under some statutory articulations, the
scope of the fiduciary duty may be limited to company-related harms).
79

80 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17704.09(b) (stating that the duty of loyalty is “limited
to” listed company-related obligations); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(b) (1996)
(same). Consider the following observations from a comment to the analogous provision of the 2013 Revised Uniform Partnership Act:
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sion-based dissolution provisions, buyouts and other useful alternative
remedies are well-established. 81 Whether such remedies are available in a
breach of fiduciary duty action is more of an open question. 82 Finally,
while a substantial amount of precedent makes clear that an owner’s participatory rights (e.g., employment and management rights) can be protected under the oppression doctrine, 83 it is less clear whether such rights
would be viewed as within the scope of a conventional fiduciary duty
action. 84
. . . . The 2011 and 2013 Harmonization amendments made one major substantive change; they
“un-cabined” fiduciary duty. UPA (1997) § 404
had deviated substantially from UPA (1914) by
purporting to codify all fiduciary duties owed by
partners. This approach had a number of problems. Most notably, the exhaustive list of fiduciary
duties left no room for the fiduciary duty owed by
partners to each other—i.e., “the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Although UPA (1997)
§ 404(b) purported to state “[a] partner’s duty of
loyalty to the partnership and the other partners”
(emphasis added), the three listed duties each protected the partnership and not the partners.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 cmt. (2006) (amended 2013).
See generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, ch. 8 (providing an in-depth discussion
of remedies for oppression).

81

Although breach of fiduciary duty is considered an equitable cause of action, see, e.g.,
MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, § 8.01, at 8-7, the availability of a buyout as a remedy
is much less established in the fiduciary duty case law than it is in the oppression area.
See, e.g., Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006) (rejecting a buyout award
in a breach of fiduciary duty action); see also MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, §
8.02[B][1], at 8-17 (noting that “[a] buyout is the most common remedy for oppression”).
82

83

See, e.g., MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, § 7.01[C][1]–[2], at 7-22 to 7-30.

See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About . . . ?, 33 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 471, 491 (2011) (noting that “under traditional corporate law principles, employment and management positions are not ordinarily viewed as part of
one’s rights as a shareholder; thus, terminations of employment and removals from
management do not generally invoke a fiduciary duty analysis”); see also Berman v. Phys84
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3. Other Dissolution Grounds
Perhaps the smaller number of LLC statutes with oppressionrelated dissolution provisions can be explained by the inclusion of other
judicial dissolution grounds that are broad enough to encompass oppressive conduct. For example, and as mentioned, fifty-four statutes provide
for dissolution when it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the LLC’s governing documents. 85 In some situations, this language might be useful to combat oppressive conduct,
such as when the majority is denying the minority certain financial or
participatory rights that are promised in the certificate or operating
agreement. Such guaranteed rights are rare, 86 however, and the statutory
language seems too indirect to squarely deal with the myriad forms of
oppressive behavior. 87 Indeed, the case law addressing the language has
ical Med. Assocs., 225 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that “any injury caused by
the termination decision itself would be an injury to his interests as an employee, not as
a stockholder”).
85

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

Cf. Moll, supra note 3, at 952–56 (arguing that the typical member of an LLC is unlikely to effectively contract for protection from abusive majority conduct).
86

See, e.g., In re Seneca Investments LLC, 970 A.2d 259, 263 (Del. Ch. 2008) (stating
that, under the Delaware judicial dissolution statute, “the inquiry must focus on whether it is now impracticable for Seneca [the LLC] to fulfill its business purpose”); id. (“Petitioner argues that dissolution is proper because Seneca has failed to comply with certain provisions of the Operating Agreement that allegedly require, among other things,
that the Company make certain cash distributions, provide reports to the Company's
stockholders, and continue to allow Tierney to serve as a director. Even assuming that
Seneca is in violation of some provisions of its operating agreement, such violations are
not grounds for this Court to order dissolution of an LLC. The role of this Court in
ordering dissolution under § 18-802 is limited, and the Court of Chancery will not attempt to police violations of operating agreements by dissolving LLCs.”); cf. Dennis S.
Karjala, Planning Problems in the Limited Liability Company, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 455, 471
(1995) (“[I]n [some states], a court may order dissolution in an action by a member if it
is established that it is ‘not reasonably practicable to carry on the business’ according to
the articles or an operating agreement. Yet it is often possible to carry on the business
while freezing a minority interest out of any return.” (footnote omitted)).
87

As to the “myriad forms of oppressive behavior,” see MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note
47, § 7.01[C][8], at 7-44 & n.106 (noting that “oppressive conduct can present itself in a
wide variety of forms”).
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focused more on the frustration of the company’s purpose than on the
unfair treatment of a minority member. 88
Some statutes provide for dissolution when there is member conduct that makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
business with that member. 89 Perhaps that language could be used by a
court to provide a remedy against an oppressive majority whose behavior
is repeatedly abusive towards minority owners. Unfortunately, only seven statutes include such language. 90 The ability to dissolve when “other
circumstances render dissolution equitable” could certainly be used to
remedy oppressive majority conduct, but that ground is only present in
one statute. 91
At bottom, while it is possible that other judicial dissolution
grounds might be used to remedy oppressive conduct in the LLC, the
“fit” of some of this language is questionable. Moreover, some of the
more appealing grounds are simply not present in enough statutes. Given that a sizable body of oppression case law (on both liability and remedy issues) already exists, 92 it seems somewhat pointless to make litigants
and courts reinvent the wheel. Put differently, an explicit judicial dissolution ground for oppressive conduct seems more effective than compelling litigants and courts to stretch other grounds to cover oppressive behavior.

88

See supra notes 35–37, 87 and accompanying text.

89

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

See supra note 27 and accompanying text. In addition, five of these seven statutes
(Hawaii, Montana, South Carolina, West Virginia, and ULLCA) also provide an oppression-related dissolution provision. Under these statutes, therefore, the “not reasonably
practicable to carry on the company’s business with that member” ground is not serving as a substitute for an oppression-related provision.
90

91

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

See generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, ch. 7 (providing an in-depth discussion
of the oppression doctrine); id. ch. 8 (providing an in-depth discussion of remedies for
oppression).
92
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4. The Vagueness of the Oppression Doctrine
Perhaps the smaller number of oppression-related dissolution
provisions in the LLC context stems from a disapproval of the oppression doctrine itself. In many jurisdictions, oppression is defined in terms
that require courts to ascertain whether there has been “burdensome,
harsh and wrongful conduct” or a frustration of the minority’s “reasonable expectations.” 93 Such terms may be considered too vague to guide
business owners and to produce consistent judicial results. The smaller
number of oppression-related statutes, therefore, may be due to a conscious legislative rejection of the oppression doctrine in the LLC setting.
A few responses might be made to this argument. First, the
number of jurisdictions with oppression-related dissolution statutes in
the corporation setting has not decreased. 94 If conscious legislative rejections of the doctrine were occurring, one would expect to see changes in
the corporation statutes as well. Second, and as mentioned, a sizable
body of oppression case law exists that helps to mitigate any perceived
vagueness or uncertainty surrounding the doctrine. 95 Third, the oppression doctrine seems no more vague than the notion of a fiduciary duty of
loyalty owed to individual members, which many jurisdictions embrace. 96
Such manager-to-member or member-to-member duties are not defined
by statute, 97 and courts will likely define such duties in generalized “good

93

See, e.g., id. § 7.01[D][1][b][i], at 7-75 to 7-76.

In fact, it has increased. Effective January 1, 2015, Louisiana became the fortieth
state in the country to provide statutory relief for oppressive conduct. See Moll, supra
note 51, at 462 & n.5.
94

95

See supra note 92 and accompanying text.

96

See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006); id. § 409 cmt. (stating that
“it is impracticable to cabin all LLC-related fiduciary duties within a statutory formulation,” and indicating that the act “codifies the core of the fiduciary duty of loyalty . . .
but . . . does not purport to discern every possible category of overreaching”); REVISED
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006) (amended 2013); id. § 409 cmt. (stating that the
statute “recognizes two core managerial duties but, unlike some earlier uniform acts,
does not purport to state all managerial duties”).
97
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faith” 98 or “fairness” 99 terms—terms that are arguably just as vague as
“burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct” and “reasonable expectations.”
CONCLUSION

Judicial dissolution provisions in the LLC setting vary widely, although the existence of modern uniform acts are likely to lessen these
jurisdictional variations over time. This article has attempted to catalog
the statutory differences and to explore a few selected issues raised by
the diverse approaches. With respect to dissolution when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the governing documents—the most common judicial dissolution ground—this
article has argued that the impracticability of carrying on the business in
conformity with either the certificate or the operating agreement should
result in dissolution. Nevertheless, there is confusion over which of the
various statutory articulations reaches that result. With respect to dissolution on the grounds of oppressive conduct, this article has provided
some explanations for why oppression-related dissolution statutes are
less common in the LLC setting than in the corporation context. As
states continue to reconsider their LLC statutes in light of the modern
uniform acts, they may realize that their past elimination of exit rights
has contributed to the present vulnerability of minority members. As a
result, the number of oppression-related dissolution provisions in the
LLC setting will, ideally, increase.

See, e.g., VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *1, 4–5 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 31, 2000) (stating that managers owed a duty of loyalty to the LLC’s “investors,”
and ultimately concluding that managers “failed to discharge their duty of loyalty . . . in
good faith” (emphasis added)); infra note 99.
98

Cf. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 104.2 (2012) (stating
that to comply with a fiduciary duty, the defendant must show, in part, that “the transaction[s] in question [was/were] fair and equitable to [Plaintiff],” and that “[Defendant]
acted in the utmost good faith and exercised the most scrupulous honesty toward
[Plaintiff]” (italics omitted)).
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Appendix 1
Statutory Language
State
Alabama

Citation
ALA. CODE § 10A5A-7.01

Alaska

ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.50.405

Arizona

Dissolution Ground(s)
“(d) On application by a member, the entry of an order dissolving the limited liability company on the grounds that it is
not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liability comSee also § 10A-5A- pany’s activities and affairs in conformity with the limited lia7.02
bility company agreement, which order is entered by the circuit
court for the county in which the limited liability company’s
principal place of business within this state is located, and if the
limited liability company does not have a principal place of
business within this state then by the circuit court for the
county in which the limited liability company’s most recent registered office is located.”

See also § 10.50.400
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 29-785

“On application by or for a member of a limited liability company, the superior court may order the company dissolved if
the court determines that it is impossible for the company to
carry on the purposes of the company.”
“A. On application by or for a member, the superior court in
the county in which the known place of business of the limited
liability company is located may decree dissolution of a limited

See also § 29-781

Arkansas

ARK. CODE. ANN.
§ 4-32-902
See also § 4-32-901

liability company on judicial determination of any of the following:
1. It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liability
company business in conformity with an operating agreement.
2. Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement, the
members or managers are deadlocked in the management of
the limited liability company and irreparable injury to the limited liability company is threatened or being suffered or the
business of the limited liability company cannot be conducted
to the advantage of the members generally because of the deadlock.
3. Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement, the
members or managers of the limited liability company have
acted or are acting in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent with
respect to the business of the limited liability company.
4. Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement, substantial assets of the limited liability company are being wasted,
misapplied or diverted for purposes not related to the business
of the limited liability company.”
“On application by or for a member, a circuit court may decree
dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the limited liability company in conformity with the operating agreement.”

California

CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 17707.03
See also § 17707.01

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 7-80-810
See also § 7-80-801

“(a) Pursuant to an action filed by any manager or by any member or members of a limited liability company, a court of competent jurisdiction may decree the dissolution of a limited liability company whenever any of the events specified in subdivision (b) occurs.
(b)(1) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business
in conformity with the articles of organization or operating
agreement.
(2) Dissolution is reasonably necessary for the protection of
the rights or interests of the complaining members.
(3) The business of the limited liability company has been abandoned.
(4) The management of the limited liability company is deadlocked or subject to internal dissension.
(5) Those in control of the limited liability company have been
guilty of, or have knowingly countenanced, persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority.”
“(2) A limited liability company may be dissolved in a proceeding by or for a member or manager of the limited liability company if it is established that it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business of the limited liability company in conformity with the operating agreement of said company.”

Connecticut

Delaware

CONN. GEN. STAT. “(a) A limited liability company is dissolved, and its activities
§ 34-267
and affairs must be wound up, upon the occurrence of any of
the following:
...
(4) On application by a member, the entry by the Superior
Court for the judicial district where the principal office of the
limited liability company is located, or if none in this state,
where its registered agent is located, of an order dissolving the
company on the grounds that: (A) The conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities and affairs is unlawful;
or (B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities and affairs;
(5) On application by a member, the entry by the Superior
Court for the judicial district where the principal office of the
limited liability company is located, of an order dissolving the
company on the grounds that the managers or those members
in control of the company: (A) Have acted, are acting or will
act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent; or (B) have acted
or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will
be directly harmful to the applicant . . . .”
DEL. CODE ANN. “On application by or for a member or manager the Court of
tit. 6, § 18-802
Chancery may decree dissolution of a limited liability company
whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the busiSee also § 18-801
ness in conformity with a limited liability company agreement.”

District of
Columbia

D.C. CODE § 29807.01

Florida

FLA. STAT.
§ 605.0702(1)

“(a) A limited liability company is dissolved, and its activities
and affairs shall be wound up, upon the occurrence of any of
the following:
...
(4) On application by a member, the entry by Superior Court
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:
(A) The conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities and affairs is unlawful; or
(B) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities and affairs in conformity with the certificate of organization and the operating agreement.
(5) On application by a member, the entry by Superior Court
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that the
managers or those members in control of the company:
(A) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(B) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”
“(b) In a proceeding by a manager or member if it is established
that:
1. The conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities and affairs is unlawful;

See also
§§ 605.0701,
605.0705

Georgia

Hawaii

GA. CODE. ANN.
§ 14-11-603
See also § 14-11602(b)
HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 428-801

2. It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities and affairs in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement;
3. The managers or members in control of the company have
acted, are acting, or are reasonably expected to act in a manner
that is illegal or fraudulent;
4. The limited liability company’s assets are being misappropriated or wasted, causing injury to the limited liability company,
or in a proceeding by a member, causing injury to one or more
of its members; or
5. The managers or the members of the limited liability company are deadlocked in the management of the limited liability
company’s activities and affairs, the members are unable to
break the deadlock, and irreparable injury to the limited liability
company is threatened or being suffered.”
“(a) On application by or for a member, the court may decree
dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with
the articles of organization or a written operating agreement.”
“(4) On application by a member or a dissociated member,
upon entry of a judicial decree that:
(A) The economic purpose of the company is likely to be unreasonably frustrated;

Idaho

(B) Another member has engaged in conduct relating to the
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to
carry on the company’s business with that member;
(C) It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement;
(D) The company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distributional interest as required by section 428-701; or
(E) The managers or members in control of the company have
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner . . . .”
IDAHO CODE § 30- “(4) On application by a member, the entry by the district court
25-701(a)
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:
(A) The conduct of all or substantially all the company’s activities and affairs is unlawful; or
(B) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities and affairs in conformity with the certificate of organization and the operating agreement; or
(C) The managers or those members in control of the company:
(i) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(ii) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant . . . .”

Illinois

805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 180/35-1(a)

Indiana

IND. CODE § 2318-9-2
See also § 23-18-91.1

“(4) On application by a member or a dissociated member,
upon entry of a judicial decree that:
(A) the economic purpose of the company has been or is likely
to be unreasonably frustrated;
(B) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful;
(C) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement.
(5) On application by a member or transferee of a distributional
interest, upon entry of a judicial decree that the managers or
those members in control of the company:
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”
“On application by or for a member, the circuit or superior
court of the county in which the limited liability company’s
principal office, or if there is none in Indiana, in which the registered office is located, may decree dissolution of the limited
liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.”

Iowa

IOWA CODE
§ 489.701(1)

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-76,117

“d. On application by a member, the entry by a district court
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that any of
the following applies:
(1) The conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful.
(2) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities in conformity with the certificate of organization and
the operating agreement.
e. On application by a member or transferee, the entry by a
district court of an order dissolving the company on the
grounds that the managers or those members in control of the
company have done any of the following:
(1) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent.
(2) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”
“(b) If the business of the limited liability company is suffering
or is threatened with irreparable injury because the members
of a limited liability company, or the managers of a limited liability company having more than one manager, are so deadlocked respecting the management of the affairs of the limited
liability company that the requisite vote for action cannot be
obtained and the members are unable to terminate such deadlock, then any member or members in the aggregate owning at

Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 275.290
See also § 275.285

Louisiana

LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:1335

Maine

ME. STAT. tit. 31,
§ 1595(1)

least 25% of the outstanding interests in either capital or profits
and losses in the limited liability company may file with the district court a petition stating that such member or members desire to dissolve the limited liability company and to dispose of
the assets thereof in accordance with a plan to be agreed upon
by the members or as determined by the district court in the
absence of such agreement.”
“(1) The Circuit Court for the county in which the principal
office of the limited liability company is located, or, if none, in
the county of the registered office, may dissolve a limited liability company in a proceeding by a member if it is established
that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of
the limited liability company in conformity with the operating
agreement.”
“On application by or for a member, any court of competent
jurisdiction may decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.”
“D. On application by a member, the entry by the Superior
Court of an order dissolving the limited liability company on
the grounds that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
limited liability company’s activities in conformity with the limited liability company agreement;

Maryland

MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS’NS
§ 4A-903
See also § 4A-902

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 156C, § 44
See also § 43

Michigan

MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 450.4802
See also § 450.4801

Minnesota

MINN. STAT.
§ 322C.0701

E. On application by a member, the entry by the Superior
Court of an order dissolving the limited liability company on
the grounds that the members in control of the limited liability
company have acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is
illegal or fraudulent . . . .”
“On application by or on behalf of a member, the circuit court
of the county in which the principal office of the limited liability company is located may decree the dissolution of the limited
liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or the operating agreement.”
“On application by or for a member or manager the superior
court department of the trial court may decree dissolution of a
limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on its business in conformity with the certificate
of organization or the operating agreement.”
“Upon application by or for a member, the circuit court for the
county in which the registered office of a limited liability company is located may decree dissolution of the company whenever the company is unable to carry on business in conformity
with the articles of organization or operating agreements.”
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by appropriate court
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 79-29-803

(i) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful; or
(ii) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities in conformity with the articles of organization and the
operating agreement;
(5) on application by a member, the entry by appropriate court
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that the
managers, governors, or those members in control of the company:
(i) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(ii) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant . . . .”
“(1) On application by or for a member, the chancery court for
the county in which the principal office of the limited liability
company is located, or the Chancery Court of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County, Mississippi, if the limited liability
company does not have a principal office in this state, may decree dissolution of a limited liability company:
(a) Whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in conformity with the certificate of formation or the
operating agreement; [or]
(b) Whenever the managers or the members in control of the
limited liability company have been guilty of or have knowingly

Missouri

MO. REV. STAT.
§ 347.143
See also § 347.137

Montana

MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-8-902

countenanced persistent and pervasive fraud or abuse of authority, or the property of the limited liability company is being
misapplied or wasted by such persons . . . .”
“2. On application by or for a member, the circuit court for the
county in which the registered office of the limited liability
company is located may decree dissolution of a limited liability
company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on
the business in conformity with the operating agreement.”
“(1) On application by or for a member or a dissociated member, a district court may order dissolution of a limited liability
company, or other appropriate relief, when:
(a) the economic purpose of the company is likely to be unreasonably frustrated;
(b) another member has engaged in conduct relating to the
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to
carry on the company’s business with that member remaining
as a member;
(c) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement;
(d) the company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distributional interest as required by 35-8-805; or

Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 21-147(a)

Nevada

NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 86.495

New
Hampshire

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304-C:134

(e) the members or managers in control of the company have
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner.”
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by the district court
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:
(A) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful; or
(B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities in conformity with the certificate of organization and
the operating agreement; or
(5) on application by a member, the entry by the district court
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that the
managers or those members in control of the company:
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”
“1. Upon application by or for a member, the district court may
decree dissolution of a limited-liability company whenever it is
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the company in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.”
“I. Unless the operating agreement provides otherwise, upon
application by a member, the superior court may decree the

dissolution of a limited liability company in any of the following circumstances:
(a) It is not reasonably practicable for the limited liability company to carry on its business.
(b) A voting deadlock has occurred among the members and,
upon the occurrence of the deadlock, the members have been
unable to break the deadlock; and because of the deadlock, either irreparable injury to the limited liability company is threatened or being suffered or the limited liability company’s business and internal affairs can no longer be conducted to its advantage.
...
III. A member shall have the right to apply to the superior
court to decree the dissolution of a limited liability company,
and the superior court may issue such a decree, in any of the
following circumstances:
(a) The limited liability company has procured its certificate of
formation through fraud.
(b) The limited liability company has exceeded or abused its
lawful authority under this act.
(c) The limited liability company has carried on, conducted, or
transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal
manner.

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:2C-48(a)

New Mexico

N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-19-40

New York

N.Y. LTD. LIAB.
CO. LAW § 702

(d) The limited liability company has abused its power contrary
to the public policy of the state.”
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by the Superior
Court of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:
(a) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful; or
(b) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities in conformity with one or both of the certificate of
formation and the operating agreement; or
(5) on application by a member, the entry by the Superior
Court of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that
the managers or those members in control of the company:
(a) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(b) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”
“On application by or for a member, a court may decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on its business in conformity with
its articles of organization or operating agreement.”
“On application by or for a member, the supreme court in the
judicial district in which the office of the limited liability company is located may decree dissolution of a limited liability
company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on

North
Carolina

North Dakota

the business in conformity with the articles of organization or
operating agreement . . . .”
N.C. GEN. STAT.
“The superior court may dissolve an LLC in a proceeding
§ 57D-6-02
brought by either of the following:
...
(2) A member, if it is established that (i) it is not practicable to
conduct the LLC’s business in conformance with the operating
agreement and this Chapter or (ii) liquidation of the LLC is
necessary to protect the rights and interests of the member.”
N.D. CENT. CODE. “d. On application by a member, the entry by appropriate court
§ 10-32.1-50(1)
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:
(1) The conduct of all or substantially all of the activities of the
company are unlawful; or
(2) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the activities of
the company in conformity with the articles of organization
and the operating agreement;
e. On application by a member, the entry by appropriate court
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that the
managers, governors, or those members in control of the company:
(1) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(2) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1705.47

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. tit.
18, § 2038

“On application by a member of a limited liability company,
the tribunal may declare a limited liability company dissolved,
and the limited liability company’s business shall be wound up
upon the occurrence of any of the following events:
(A) An event that makes it unlawful for all or substantially all
of the business of the limited liability company to be continued,
but a cure of illegality within ninety days after notice to the
limited liability company of the event is effective retroactively
to the date of the event for purposes of this section;
(B) A determination by the tribunal that any of the following is
true:
(1) The economic purpose of the limited liability company is
likely to be unreasonably frustrated.
(2) Another member has engaged in conduct relating to the
limited liability company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business with that member.
(3) It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the
limited liability company’s business in conformity with the operating agreement.”
“On application by or for a member, the district court may decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.”

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT.
§ 63.661

Pennsylvania

15 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 8871(a)

Rhode Island

7 R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-16-40

South
Carolina

S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-44-801

“(2) In a proceeding by or for a member if it is established that
it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the
limited liability company in conformance with its articles of organization or any operating agreement.”
“(4) On application by a member, the entry by the court of an
order dissolving the company on the grounds that:
(i) the conduct of all or substantially all the company’s activities
and affairs is unlawful;
(ii) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities and affairs in conformity with the certificate of organization and the operating agreement; or
(iii) the managers or those members in control of the company:
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”
“On application by or on behalf of a member, the superior
court may decree dissolution of a limited liability company
whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.”
“(4) on application by a member or a dissociated member,
upon entry of a judicial decree that:

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 47-34A801(a)

(a) the economic purpose of the company is likely to be unreasonably frustrated;
(b) another member has engaged in conduct relating to the
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to
carry on the company’s business with that member;
(c) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement;
(d) the company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distributional interest after giving effect to provisions of the operating
agreement modifying or superseding the provisions of Section
33-44-701; or
(e) the managers or members in control of the company have
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is unlawful, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner
. . . .”
“(4) On application by a member or a dissociated member,
upon entry of a judicial decree that:
(i) The economic purpose of the company is likely to be unreasonably frustrated;
(ii) Another member has engaged in conduct relating to the
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to
carry on the company’s business with that member;

Tennessee

Texas

(iii) It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement; or
(iv) The managers or members in control of the company have
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent.”
TENN. CODE ANN. “(a) On application by the attorney general and reporter or by
§ 48-245-902 (LLC or for a member, the court may decree dissolution, winding up
formed before
and termination of an LLC whenever it is not reasonably prac1/1/06)
ticable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles
and/or the operating agreement.”
TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-249-617 (LLC “(a) Judicial Decree. On application by the attorney general and
formed 1/1/06 or reporter, or by or for a member, the court may decree dissolution, winding up and termination of an LLC whenever it is not
later)
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity
with the LLC documents.”
TEX. BUS. ORGS.
“A district court in the county in which the registered office or
CODE ANN.
principal place of business in this state of a domestic partner§ 11.314
ship or limited liability company is located has jurisdiction to
order the winding up and termination of the domestic partnership or limited liability company on application by an owner of
the partnership or limited liability company if the court determines that:

Utah

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-3a-701

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 4101(a)

...
(3) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the entity’s business in conformity with its governing documents.”
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by the district court
of an order dissolving the limited liability company on the
grounds that:
(a) the conduct of all or substantially all of the limited liability
company’s activities and affairs is unlawful; or
(b) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liability company’s activities and affairs in conformity with the certificate of organization and the operating agreement;
(5) on application by a member, the entry by the district court
of an order dissolving the limited liability company on the
grounds that the managers or those members in control of the
limited liability company:
(a) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(b) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant
. . . .”
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by the Superior
Court of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:
(A) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful; or

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1047

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE
§ 25.15.274

West Virginia

W. VA. CODE
§ 31B-8-801(b)

(B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities in conformance with the certificate of organization
and the operating agreement; or
(5) on application by a member, the entry by the Superior
Court of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that
the managers or those members in control of the company:
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”
“A. On application by or for a member, the circuit court of the
locality in which the registered office of the limited liability
company is located may decree dissolution of a limited liability
company if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization and any
operating agreement.”
“On application by a member or manager the superior courts
may order dissolution of a limited liability company whenever:
(1) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liability company’s activities in conformity with the certificate of
formation and the limited liability company agreement; or (2)
other circumstances render dissolution equitable.”
“(5) On application by a member or a dissociated member,
upon entry of a judicial decree that:

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT.
§ 183.0902

(i) The economic purpose of the company is likely to be unreasonably frustrated;
(ii) Another member has engaged in conduct relating to the
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to
carry on the company’s business with that member;
(iii) It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement;
(iv) The company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distributional interest as required by section 7-701; or
(v) The managers or members in control of the company have
acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner . . . .”
“In a proceeding by or for a member, the circuit court for the
county where the limited liability company’s principal office,
or, if none in this state, its registered office, is or was last located may order dissolution of a limited liability company if any
of the following is established:
(1) That it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business
of the limited liability company.
(2) That the limited liability company is not acting in conformity with an operating agreement.
(3) That one or more managers are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent.

Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-29-701(a)

Prototype
LLC Act

PROTOTYPE LTD.
LIAB. CO. ACT
§ 902 (1992)

(4) That one or more members in control of the limited liability
company are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent.
(5) That limited liability company assets are being misapplied
or wasted.”
“(iv) On application by a member, the entry of a court order
dissolving the company on the grounds that:
(A) The conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful; or
(B) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities in conformity with the articles of organization and the
operating agreement; or
(v) On application by a member or dissociated member, the
entry of a court order dissolving the company on the grounds
that the managers or those members in control of the company:
(A) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(B) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”
“On application by or for a member, the [designate the appropriate court] may decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the

Revised Prototype LLC
Act

REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB.
CO. ACT § 706

ULLCA

UNIF. LTD. LIAB.
CO. ACT § 801
(1996)

RULLCA

REVISED UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. CO.

(2011)

business of the limited liability company in conformity with the
operating agreement.”
“(e) on application by a member, the entry by the [appropriate
court] of an order dissolving the limited liability company on
the grounds that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
limited liability company’s activities in conformity with the limited liability company agreement.”
“(4) on application by a member or a dissociated member,
upon entry of a judicial decree that:
(i) the economic purpose of the company is likely to be unreasonably frustrated;
(ii) another member has engaged in conduct relating to the
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to
carry on the company’s business with that member;
(iii) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement;
(iv) the company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distributional interest as required by Section 701; or
(v) the managers or members in control of the company have
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner . . . .”
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by [appropriate
court] of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:

ACT § 701(a)
(2006)

RULLCA
(2013)

REVISED UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. CO.
ACT § 701(a)
(2006) (Amended
2013)

(A) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful; or
(B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities in conformity with the certificate of organization and
the operating agreement; or
(5) on application by a member, the entry by [appropriate
court] of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that
the managers or those members in control of the company:
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.”
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by [the appropriate
court] of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:
(A) the conduct of all or substantially all the company’s activities and affairs is unlawful;
(B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
activities and affairs in conformity with the certificate of organization and the operating agreement; or
(C) the managers or those members in control of the company:
(i) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal
or fraudulent; or
(ii) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant . . . .”

Appendix 2
Data Summary
1. Purpose of the company cannot be accomplished

10 statutes

a. Impossible to carry on the purposes of the company
AK
b. Economic purpose likely to be unreasonably frustrated
HI
IL
MT
OH
SC
SD

WV

ULLCA

c. Business has been abandoned
CA
2. Not reasonably practicable to carry on the business
in conformity with the governing documents

54 statutes (WI listed twice)

a. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business in conformity with the LLC agreement/operating agreement
AL
AZ
AR
CO
DE
KY
ME
MO
OH
WI
ProtoRevised
type
Prototype

b. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business in conformity with the articles of organization OR operating agreement
CA
GA
IN
LA
MA
MD
MI
MS
NJ
“one or
both”

NM

NV

NY

OK

OR

RI

TN
“and/or”;
“in conformity
with the
LLC documents,” defined as either or
both

c. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business in conformity with the articles of organization AND operating agreement
DC
FL
HI
IA
ID
IL
MN
MT
ND

NE

PA

SC

SD

VT

WA

WV

WY

ULLCA

TX
“in conformity
with its
governing
documents”
RULLCA

UT

VA

RULLCA
(2013)

d. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business in conformity with the operating agreement and this Chapter
NC

e. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business
CT
NH
WI
also LLC
“not acting
in conformity
with an
operating
agreement”
3. Member or manager deadlock
AZ

CA

FL

5 statutes
KS

NH

4. Unlawful, illegal, or fraudulent conduct by
members, managers, or company
AZ

IL

CA
also mismanagement
ground
ME
members
in control
only

29 statutes

CT

DC

FL

MN

MS
persistent and
pervasive
fraud or
abuse of
authority

MT
managers and
members
only

HI
IA
managers and
members
only
ND
NE

ID

NH
LLC procured certificate
through
fraud; or
exceeded its
lawful authority under the Act;
also persistently
fraudulent
or illegal
conduct

NJ

WV

OH
PA
unlawful
for the
business
of the
LLC to
be continued
WY
ULLCA

managers
and members only

managers
and members only

5. Waste or misapplication of assets
AZ

FL

MS

SC

SD

RULLC
A

RULLC
A
(2013)

UT

4 statutes
WI

VT

WI
managers
and members only

6. Oppression

24 statutes (CA listed twice)

a. Conduct that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner
CT
DC
HI
IA
ID
IL
ND
NE
NJ
PA
SC
UT
WV
WY
ULLCA
RULLCA
RULLCA
(2013)

MN
VT

b. Dissolution necessary to protect rights or interests of complaining member
CA
NC
“rights or
“rights and
interests”
interests”
c. Abuse of authority by managers or members
CA
MS
persistent
and pervasive fraud
or abuse
of authority

MT
WI

7. Member conduct that makes it not reasonably
practicable to carry on the company’s business
with that member
HI

MT

OH

SC

7 statutes

SD

8. Failure to purchase petitioner’s distributional
interest when required
HI

MT

SC

WV

WV

5 statutes
ULLCA

9. Other circumstances render dissolution equitable

1 statute

WA
10. LLC has abused its power contrary to public
policy of this state
NH

ULLCA

1 statute

